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Abstract 
The paper investigates net lending and net borrowing flows of the institutional sectors in 
Europe since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Applying a simple statistical apparatus, 
this paper is novel in describing the sectoral behavior leading up to and during the crisis. 
We find that (1) many countries of the Northern group were characterized by low public 
deficits or even budget surpluses, current account surpluses and a private sector in a net 
lending position. In countries of the Southern periphery, in the Anglo-Saxon countries as 
well as in many Eastern European Economies private sector net borrowing coincided with 
a budget deficit and substantial current account deficits. (2) With the onset of the crisis 
private net lending soared in all countries while all governments incurred deficits, 
consistent with the notion of a balance sheet recession. (3) Private net lending is pro-cyclical, 
reinforcing the economic downturn, while public net lending is countercyclical in all 
countries. (4) Household net lending tends to lead the business cycle, while corporate net 
lending tends to lag it especially in the Northern group. (5) Prominent concepts asserting 
causal relationships in sectoral net lending, such as Ricardian equivalence and the twin deficit 
hypothesis are not supported by the data. 
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imbalances 
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1 Introduction 
Many economic theories as well as policy responses to the Euro crisis implicitly make assumptions 
about sectoral behavior, in particular about the net lending and net borrowing flows of households, 
non-financial corporations, financial corporations, the government and the rest of the world. For 
Neoclassical economists the Euro Crisis is predominantly a sovereign debt crisis, caused by lax 
fiscal policy of untrustworthy governments, and much of the debate revolves around the impact 
of sovereign debt levels on growth (see e.g. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010), while Keynesian 
macroeconomists have emphasized current account imbalances as the cause of the Euro crisis (see 
e.g. Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2013). The discussions of the crisis, both mainstream and heterodox, 
thus implicitly differ over the net borrowing flows of one particular institutional sector. These 
views of the macroeconomy and its institutional sectors bear the risk of being one-sided. In 
addition, many prominent concepts such as the twin deficit hypothesis or Ricardian equivalence, which 
latently feature in recent calls for austerity (Laski and Podkaminer, 2012), boil down to assertions 
about causal relationships between sectoral net lending and net borrowing flows. We propose an 
integrated analysis taking into account all five sectors.2                                                         1 Financial support from the OeNB Anniversary Fund (grant no. 15330) is gratefully acknowledged. Rezai thanks 
the Austrian Science Fund (grant no: J 3633-G11) for financial support. 
** Department of Socioeconomics, WU - Vienna University of Economics and Business.  
Corresponding Author: florentin.gloetzl@wu.ac.at ; Welthandelsplatz 2, D5, 1020 Wien, Austria 
2 The macroeconomic behavior of the institutional sectors is one of the main questions in economics since the 
invention of the system of national accounts by Richard Stone and James Meade in 1941 (Great Britain Treasury, 
1941), a system eventually tracing back to John Maynard Keynes’ (Keynes, 1936) elaboration that aggregate saving is 
equal to aggregate investment2, or put differently, that national income can be identified with national output. These 
ideas are also found in earlier works of American Institutionalists such as Wesley Clair Mitchell and Colin Clark 
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Changes in the national accounts introduced with the European System of Accounts 1995 allow a 
data-driven perspective: a statistical analysis of the net lending flows of institutional sectors, 
especially of processes leading up to the Great Recession and its effects on sectoral rebalancing 
across the EU. 
 
In the following, we set out to describe these developments in sectoral net lending and net 
borrowing in Europe with an emphasis on four structurally important economies: Germany, Great 
Britain, France and Spain. After a brief descriptive analysis of historical trends we apply a simple 
statistical apparatus to shed light on the cyclicality of net lending flows and study structural 
relationships between the sectors’ net lending and net borrowing. Finally, we derive policy 
recommendations for a sustained and balanced recovery. 
2 The Euro crisis from a net lending perspective - five sides of the same 
coin 
Net lending and net borrowing are derived from the national accounts, guaranteeing that adding 
up-constraints imposed by the mechanism of net balances, as coined by Wolfgang Stützel (1978), are 
satisfied. Each sector 𝑖𝑖  receives an income Y𝑖𝑖  and has an expenditure E𝑖𝑖 . Equally, each sector 
undertakes investments I𝑖𝑖 and savings S𝑖𝑖 . The difference between income and expenditure or, put 
differently, between investment and saving is the net financing need of sector, i.e. net lending. Net 
lending can thus also be understood as the net change of financial assets ΔA𝑖𝑖 and financial liabilities 
ΔL𝑖𝑖 and is the balancing item of the non-financial with the financial accounts.3 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 =  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖− 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = −𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
With positive net lending, a sector provides lending to the rest of the economy. With negative net 
lending (positive net borrowing) a sector borrows resources from the rest of the economy. Since 
in the aggregate, lending needs to match borrowing, the sum of all sectors’ net lending and net 
borrowing must equal zero: ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008) use this framework to show 
that connections of public and foreign sectoral net lending congruent with the twin deficit hypothesis, 
which is often cited for the US, can only be observed infrequently. They further find that in the 
US private sector net lending and net borrowing is pro-cyclical, with household net borrowing 
usually leading the business cycle and business net borrowing tracking or lagging it, while the 
government behaves counter-cyclically. 
 
We start our analysis by presenting the  net lending (+) and net borrowing (-) flows of the five 
institutional sectors (households, non-financial corporations, financial corporations, government 
and rest of the world) for Germany, Great Britain, France, and Spain, jointly comprising about 
                                                        
(Mirowski, 1989) and ultimately go back to Venetian double-entry bookkeeping, invented in the twelfth century and 
was later in 1494 systematically reviewed in the famous ‘Summa de arithmetica geometria proportioni et proportionalita’ by the 
Italian monk and mathematician Luca Pacioli (Chatfield and Vangermeersch, 1996). 3 The equivalent concept in the financial accounts is ‘net financial transactions’. In the following data from the non-
financial accounts will be used due to its consistency with saving and investment. Where not available, we will resort 
to data from the financial accounts, though deviations between the calculations in the two accounts can be substantial. 
A detailed overview over the data provenance for each country can be found in the appendix. 
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60% of EU output, between 1999 and 2013 in percent of GDP.4 Shaded areas indicate periods 
with negative year-on-year growth of real GDP to visualize recession periods.  
Germany  Spain 
 
France Great Britain 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Net lending (+) and net borrowing (-) flows (in percent of GDP) for 1999-2013 for households, non-financial 
corporations, financial corporations, government, and the rest of the world. Net lending flows exhibit large 
heterogeneity across countries. 
 
The first observation in figure 1 is the apparent absence of common macroeconomic dynamics 
across countries. This is remarkable as France, Germany, and Spain have been exposed to the same 
monetary policy and prior to 2007 a large literature has argued for convergence among Euro 
members (see Carvalho and Harvey, 2005). 
 
The upper left panel depicts Germany’s sectoral net lending and net borrowing flows. As is 
commonly known, Germany’s current account surplus (i.e. negative net lending or positive net 
borrowing of the rest of the world) has been increasing since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. 
Net borrowing peaked at around 7 percent of GDP before the crisis and fluctuated around this 
level since. In absolute terms, these cumulative current account surpluses amounted to over 1,5                                                         
4 We seasonally adjusted the data presented throughout this paper using the US Census Bureau’s X-12 ARIMA 
additive method. 
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trillion Euros between the year 1999 and 2013 (European Central Bank, 2014). German households 
have been stable net lenders to the rest of the economy at around 5 percent of GDP throughout. 
Non-financial corporations are, traditionally, net borrowers, using funds provided by the 
household (and sometimes foreign) sector to finance investment. German non-financial 
corporations, however, shifted from a net borrowing position during the early 2000s to a net 
lending position (peaking at 5 percent of GDP) during the ongoing Great Depression, mirroring 
relative shifts in profitability of firms and their reluctance to invest. Germany’s public deficit, i.e. 
negative government net lending or positive net borrowing, has been falling due to welfare reforms 
and good economic growth and reached a balanced budget prior to the Great Recession. Despite 
some government stimulus, automatic stabilizers, and the cost of saving the financial system, the 
government returned to a budget surplus, i.e. positive net lending, in 2012. The financial 
corporations sector usually plays a limited, passive role, with the exception of 2010q3 where its net 
lending rose to nearly 5 percent in the context of German banking packages. 
 
Spain (upper-right panel), in contrast, experienced a mirror-image increase in its external deficit 
from around 3 percent of GDP in the early 2000s to staggering 10 percent in 2008. The ongoing 
recession and Spain’s depressed import demand have helped boost net exports to a trade surplus 
in 2013. Prior to the crisis, households and non-financial businesses were engaging in persistent 
and significant net borrowing which peaked at 3 and 11 percent, respectively. Government was 
acting prudently by running a budget surplus while other domestic sectors engaged in a spending 
spree. The crisis introduced a structural break in the macroeconomic dynamics, just as the property 
bubble had before. With the onset of the crisis, households reduced their consumption and their 
position moved from net borrowing of 3 percent to net lending of 8 percent of GDP -- a change 
of 11 percentage points -- within two years. The shift in non-financial business net borrowing was 
even more drastic, moving from borrowing 12 percent to lending 1 percent of GDP. While the 
household net lending has been falling since the onset of the crisis, presumably due to falling 
incomes, non-financial net lending has increased further to 5 percent in recent years. Large 
increases in public deficits is the obvious counterpart to the development in household and non-
financial corporate net lending. These pre- and post-crisis macroeconomic dynamics are well-
known in the literature. They are worth highlighting, nonetheless, as they differ strongly from the 
developments in Germany (and the other countries discussed below). The policy debate on the 
causes of the Euro crisis mentioned in the introduction ultimately reduces to the question which 
of the institutional sectors is active and which accommodating. In Neoclassical lore, the 
government is the culprit who disturbs stable equilibria through its imprudent policy. To 
Keynesians, the public sector is the spender-of-last-resort who takes on the role of propping up 
demand when all other sectors find it prudent to reduce debt levels through net lending, which 
seems more plausible in light of recent Spanish data. 
 
France’s net lending dynamics are the most balanced with pre-crisis magnitudes fluctuating with in 
a 10 percent band. Its external balance has been moving from a 2 percent surplus to a 2 percent 
deficit since the onset of the Great Recession. The French household sector behaved similarly to 
Germany’s with households saving around of 5 percent of GDP per year over the whole period. 
These savings were used by non-financial business and the government to fund their expenditure. 
The crisis led to the well-known effects of an increase in lending (or reduction in borrowing) from 
households and non-financial business and an increase in government expenditure and the public 
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deficit of 6 percentage points, of the same magnitude as Germany’s increase, was, arguably, too 
little to return the economy to sustained output growth. 
 
Great Britain is a special case in many regards, not least as it is not a member of the Euro zone and 
its financial sector has a considerable impact on the macroeconomy. Great Britain has been running 
an external deficit averaging between 2-4 percent of GDP since 1999. Government balance has 
been in deficit, averaging at the same magnitude for most of the pre-crisis period. The same is true 
for households, whose net borrowing has been steadily increasing to around 5 percent prior to the 
crisis. Non-financial and financial corporations have been traditional net lenders to the UK 
economy, in contrast to France and Germany but in line with developments in Spain. The crisis 
led to a big reversal in the households’ position, increasing lending by 9 percentage points to 4 
percent of GDP. The public deficit plummeted by about the same magnitude, mimicking the 
developments in Spain. While Spain’s economy is still in depression, economic growth has been 
picking up in Great Britain due to the relative constancy of non-financial corporate net lending and 
households’ return to net borrowing, albeit hampered by the modest government austerity drives. 
The large uncertainty surrounding the ‘Brexit’ referendum is likely to lead to a postponement of 
investment decisions, renewed increases in private net lending, and a depression of aggregate 
demand.  
 
The recent macroeconomic dynamics of France, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain illustrates how 
idiosyncratic over 60% of the European economy remain. Clustering is difficult but economies 
undergoing a property boom, i.e. Spain and Great Britain, seem to exhibit household sectors with 
less prudent finances. A general feature, however, is the mutually offsetting relationship between 
the public sector and the private sector (mostly household and non-financial corporations) during 
the crisis. This relationship has been central to macroeconomics since its very beginning and to 
policy debate in Europe more pronouncedly in recent years where it has been framed in terms of 
deleveraging.  
Balance sheets, Deleveraging, and Austerity – Higher private net lending and public net 
borrowing 
The reduction in private demand in economic down-swings is a well-known fact and economic 
explanations are abound: Keynes argued along the lines of animal spirits and bear-speculators and 
for Minsky (1986) tighter lending standards by banks lead to lower investment demand. Koo (2008, 
2013) classifies recessions into different category and, invoking Keynes’ and Fisher (1933) 
arguments about the paradox of thrift and debt-deflation, introduces the concept of a balance sheet 
recession, in which private sector asset (debt) considerations – accumulated past net lending 
(borrowing) streams valued at current prices – dominate the sector’s behavior. According to Koo, 
economic agents become concerned about their debt-to-income or debt-to-equity levels which 
usually worsen drastically when an asset price bubble bursts. Households and businesses prefer 
savings to pay down debt over consumption and investment which, in turn, reduces aggregate 
demand and worsens economic prospects further. To make matters worse, in an economy with 
severe debt overhangs gets caught in a liquidity trap: the interest rate policy becomes ineffective as 
debtors are reluctant to borrow regardless of the prevailing interest rate. Gächter et al. (2015a) 
show that the investment and saving behavior of households and businesses follows patterns 
consistent with such a balance sheet recession, especially in the crisis-struck periphery of Europe. In a 
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vicious circle, companies have been hoarding cash due to the crisis and find little prospects for 
profitable investment as the overall economic situation remains in a slump caused in part by their 
own reluctance to invest. Micro-data evidence on corporate investment confirms this observation 
(Gächter et al., 2015b; Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of 
Central Banks, 2013).  
  
The private and public net lending dynamics since 2008 in figure 1 are broadly consistent with the 
notion of a Koo’s balance sheet recession. Table 1 presents an overview of mean government, private 
and foreign net lending for the period prior to the crisis (2004q1-2008q2) and after the Lehman 
crash (2008q3-2013q1). 
 
 Government Private Rest of the world 
 
2004q1 - 
2008q2 
2008q3 - 
2013q1 
2004q1 - 
2008q2 
2008q3 - 
2013q1 
2004q1 - 
2008q2 
2008q3 - 
2013q1 
AT -1.4 -3.0 4.8 5.4 -3.4 -2.3 
BE -0.8 -3.8 4.5 4.6 -3.7 -0.8 
CZ -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 2.7 3.2 1.5 
DE -1.9 -1.8 7.9 8.0 -6.0 -6.3 
DK 4.1 -2.2 -1.2 7.2 -2.9 -5.0 
EA -1.8 -4.7 2.0 4.8 -0.2 -0.1 
EE 1.9 -0.9 -13.7 3.4 11.7 -2.5 
ES 1.0 -9.6 -8.6 6.2 7.6 3.5 
FI 3.9 -1.7 0.8 1.9 -4.7 -0.3 
FR -2.9 -6.0 2.2 3.8 0.7 2.0 
GB -3.2 -8.4 1.3 6.3 1.9 2.1 
GR -7.0 -11.2 -5.1 1.7 12.2 9.5 
HU -6.9 -2.1 -1.6 2.1 8.6 0.0 
IE 0.6 -15.1 -4.4 15.3 3.3 -0.2 
IT -3.2 -3.9 2.1 1.7 1.1 2.3 
LT -0.6 -6.0 -6.7 6.9 7.4 -0.9 
NL 0.2 -3.9 7.3 9.3 -7.5 -5.4 
PL -3.5 -5.8 -0.3 3.3 3.9 2.4 
PT -4.3 -7.6 -4.5 1.2 8.7 6.3 
SE 2.2 -0.2 5.1 7.2 -7.6 -7.0 
SI -1.2 -5.5 -2.7 5.5 3.3 0.0 
SK -1.3 -5.0 -5.7 0.4 7.0 4.6 
Table 1: Net lending of the Government, the Private sector and the Rest of the World before and after the Lehman 
crash. Sectoral net lending differed strongly across countries before the crisis. After the crisis private sector net lending 
and public sector net borrowing increase sharply. 
Before the crisis, a third of the countries governments maintained a budget surplus, including the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Ireland, Estonia and Spain (first column). At the same 
time the private sector in this period was in a net lender in countries usually attributed to the 
‘Northern’ group (AT, BE, DE, FI, NL, SE) as well as in France, Great Britain and Italy (third 
column). The private sector was a net borrower in countries of the ‘Southern periphery’ (ES, GR, 
PT) as well as Ireland and many Eastern European economies (CZ, EE, HU, LT, PL, SI, SK). 
Denmark is the only Northern country in this category. External balances are shown in columns 5 
and 6, with pre-crisis balances ranging between -12.2 percent of GDP in Greece and surpluses of 
7.5 and 6 percent in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively. It is interesting to note that private 
sector net lending pairs with current account surpluses (and vice versa) in all countries except 
France, Great Britain, Italy and Denmark. 
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The response to the Great Recession was similar in all countries, despite previous heterogeneity. 
Private sectors moved (further) into net lending positions and public net borrowing increased.5 
This deleveraging effort of the private sector was largely driven by a sharp decline in investment in 
deficit countries, also contributing to a convergence of the extrema in current accounts. The 
resulting decrease in aggregate demand, however, further reinforced the recession and the 
deflationary environment, thereby also increasing the real debt burden (Gächter et al., 2015a). 
3 Net lending and net borrowing over the business cycle 
Net borrowing and lending of each sector determine and are affected by the level of aggregate 
demand. In the previous section we focused on trends prior and during the Great Recession. Here 
we apply a simple statistical apparatus to study dynamics over the business cycle more generally. 
We follow the approach of Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008) which utilizes the inherent adding-up 
constraint for the sum of net lending and net borrowing flows. This constraint also extends to the 
sum of the covariances of the net lending and net borrowing with capacity utilization. Specifically, 
we study the covariances between sectoral net lending and net borrowing series, normalized by 
GDP, and six leads and lags of capacity utilization to identify indicators for the business cycle. 
Since covariances cannot be considered (in)significant as such, we report the significance of the 
associated correlation coefficients wherever possible.6 Following Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008), we 
define capacity utilization as the deviation of real GDP from its trend, where Trend Real GDP is 
calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.7 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the covariances for net lending with dated levels of capacity utilization for 
Germany, Great Britain, France and Spain. A negative covariance indicates a pro-cyclical net 
lending behavior of a sector, in this sense it reinforces the business cycle. A positive covariance, as 
mostly observed for the government sector, indicates a counter-cyclical behavior, dampening the 
business cycle. Leads and lags of capacity utilization are plotted along the x-axis.  Markers 
(diamonds, squares, triangles…) indicate a significance of the associated correlation coefficient at 
the 10 percent level. 
Germany  Spain 
                                                         
5 Trends in Italy, Hungary, and Germany diverge partly from this pattern. 
6 See the statistical online appendix for details and derivations. 
7 Capacity Utilization = (real GDP / Trend real GDP -1) * 100, implying an average utilitzation rate of 0. 
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France Great Britain 
 
 
Figure 2: Covariances between net lending and net borrowing and leads and lags of capacity utilization. Positive values 
on the x-axis correspond to future levels (leads) of capacity utilization, negative values to past levels (lags). Public net 
lending is counter-cyclical, private net lending is pro-cyclical.  
In all four countries government net lending’s covariance with the cycle is strongly positive and 
significant, indicating a counter-cyclical behavior in line with the observations made in the previous 
sections. In Germany government net lending is offsetting all other sectors. The biggest 
counterparts are non-financial corporations followed by households. The private sector behaves 
pro-cyclically, net borrowing more during the boom than during economic downturns. The picture 
is similar in France with the difference that household net lending is significantly leading the cycle. 
In Spain the government and the rest of the world exhibit an equally strong positive covariance 
with capacity utilization at the zero lag, while also here the private sector behaves pro-cyclically, 
business to a larger extent than households. Great Britain differs from the other countries in that 
at current levels of capacity utilization government and household net lending’s covariances are 
offsetting each other almost entirely. The remaining sectors are of minor importance. These 
observations are consistent with Steindl's analysis (1990, Chapter 14) that while the conventional 
view, expressed in the Ricardian equivalence framework, would assume that net borrowing of 
households would further increase in a crisis in order to be able to keep the consumption level 
stable, it is more plausible that households will buy significantly less durable consumer goods and 
reduce residential investment. These are mainly debt financed and make up a significant part of 
total expenditure. According to Steindl, the change in demand for these goods reacts more than 
proportionally to changes in disposable income.  
 
The sequencing of sectoral net lending and the business cycle is shown in Table 2. Asterisks indicate 
changes between current levels of capacity utilization and past or future levels in at least one of the 
robustness checks. There are no changes in either sign of the covariance or switches in the lead/lag 
relationship across robustness checks. 
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Households 
Non-
financial 
Corporations 
Financial 
Corporations Government 
Rest of the 
World 
CZ  Lead  Lead  
DE o Lag Lag Lag  
DK Lead Lag Lead o Lag 
EA Lead Lag  o Lag 
ES Lead o  Lead o 
FI o Lag  o  
FR Lead o o o Lag* 
GB Lag*  Lag Lead* Lead 
GR  Lead Lag  Lead 
IE Lead Lag Lag Lead* Lag 
IT  Lag  o  
NL o*  Lag o* Lead 
PL Lag* o Lag Lead Lead* 
PT Lead* o*   Lead 
SE Lead Lag  Lag*  
SI o* o o* Lead o* 
      
Lead Net lending leads capacity utilization 
Lag Net lending lags capacity utilization 
o Covariance of net lending peaks at current levels of capacity utilization 
 No clear, significant pattern observable 
 Negative Covariance - Pro-cyclical net lending 
 Positive Covariance - Counter-cyclical net lending 
* Unstable in one of three specifications of the robustness check 
Table 2: Net lending of the institutional sectors over the cycle.8 Households net lending tends to lead, corporate net 
lending tends to lag the cycle. 
In terms of signs, private sector net lending appears pro-cyclical and external sector net lending 
counter-cyclical in virtually all countries. Public sector net lending is consistently counter-cyclical. 
When significant and robust, household net lending tends to lead or co-move with the cycle, i.e. 
household net lending tends to decrease prior to an upswing and increase before a downturn.9 
These findings are consistent with results for the United States (Barbosa-Filho et al., 2006, 2008). 
 
Non-financial corporations’ net lending lags the business cycle in most countries, especially in the 
Northern group. In Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden as well as in Italy, Ireland, and the 
Euro Area as a whole, the corporate sector increases its net borrowing only after the trough. In all 
of these countries, with the exception of Italy and the Euro Area (17), the corporate sector has                                                         
8 Countries with limited data are omitted in the table (see footnote 3). For robustness, calculations are conducted for 
two additional measures of capacity utilization: the Butterworth high-pass and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) filters 
on real GDP. 
FR • RoW is insignificant in the two alternative specifications PL • RoW shifts from Lead to o in one specification 
• HH  shifts from Lag to o in one specification 
GB • HH  shifts from Lag to o in one specification 
Gov shifts from Lead to o in one specification 
PT • HH  shifts from Lead to o in one specification 
Cor shifts from o to Lag in one specification 
IE • Gov shifts from Lead to o in one specification SE • Gov shifts from Lag to o in one specification 
NL • HH  is insignificant in the two alternative specifications  
• Gov shifts from o to Lag in one specification 
SI • HH  shifts from o to Lead in one specification 
• Fin shifts from o to Lag in one specification 
• RoW shifts from Lead to o in one specification 
 
9 Household net lending ‘Granger causes’ output movements statistically. In this sense, the cycle is HH net lending 
driven. 
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been in a net lending position for most of the observation period, with investments falling short 
of internal savings. 
 
Government net lending is countercyclical in all countries and more strongly leads than lags the 
cycle in the Eastern economies of the sample i.e. Slovenia, Poland and the Czech Republic as well 
as in Spain and, Great Britain and Ireland. In all economies of the Northern group government net 
lending either lags the cycle (Germany, Sweden) or moves with it (Finland, Denmark, Netherlands).  
 
Foreign net lending is positively associated with the cycle in all countries (except the Netherlands), 
suggesting internal demand as a determinant of the foreign balance. In Great Britain, Greece, 
Portugal, Poland and the Netherlands, foreign net lending more strongly leads than lags the cycle. 
It is most important in magnitude for Greece and Portugal, where it is the only significant counter-
cyclical sector.  
 
The financial corporate sector’s net lending exhibits small covariances with both leads and lags of 
capacity utilization and is acyclical in that no clear cyclical pattern is observable or lagging the cycle 
in many countries.  
4 Ricardian equivalence, twin deficits, and demand  
The offsetting movements of net lending and net borrowing flows touch upon central predictions 
of prominent theories. In the following these, the twin deficit hypothesis and Ricardian equivalence in 
particular, will be evaluated empirically. Barro (1974) proposed Ricardian equivalence, the idea that (in 
a neoclassical setting with perfect capital markets, perfect information, rational expectations, etc.) 
consumers internalize the government’s debt decisions in their consumption and saving behavior 
and that an increase in government net borrowing will therefore cause an increase in private net 
lending. As agents anticipate that they will have to pay higher taxes in the future, current saving 
increase in order to smooth consumption.10   
 
In a Keynesian perspective, causality traditionally runs in the opposite direction: private net lending 
is the active part, ‘causing’ public deficits. In a situation where the private sector chooses to increase 
its net lending due to animal spirits or uncertainty, the government cannot directly control its own 
deficit; the government can keep up its expenditure and run a deficit due to the lower revenues or 
decrease its spending causing a further drop in aggregate demand and thus fiscal balance. This 
produces the same pattern as expected in Ricardian equivalence, but with reversed causality. In the 
view presented here, however, budget deficits emerge passively and, as Steindl puts it, have to be 
“[…] endured like wind and rain” (Steindl 1990, Chapter 15, p. 212).  
 
The twin deficit hypothesis constitutes another prominent prediction for the structural relationship 
between particular net lending flows. It asserts that, under the assumption that all resources are 
fully employed and the domestic price level is tied to foreign prices by arbitrage in foreign trade, a                                                         
10 Consumption smoothingfeatures in multiple theories of consumption: Duesenberry's (1949) ratchet effects, the 
life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman's (1957) permanent income hypothesis. The idea 
was also already present in Keynes’ works (Keynes and Henderson, 2013) under the name ‘diversion’ and has been a 
central topic of discussion in economic policy making for a long time. 
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higher fiscal deficit will spill over into a larger external deficit through higher imports.11 From a 
theoretical perspective the concept’s shortcomings are manifold. While the underlying loanable 
funds framework is problematic, the hypothesis also overlooks the important role of distribution, 
the independent impact of monetary policy on investment via the interest rate and implies that a 
public deficit per se indicates excess consumption (Blecker, 1992). In consequence, the direction of 
causality when twin deficits occur has been heavily disputed. Summers (1988) argues that 
governments engage in ‘current account targeting’, adjusting their fiscal balance to movements in 
the external account, creating twin deficits.  
  Twin deficit hypothesis 
Ricardian 
equivalence 
Keynesian 
perspective 
Government net lending active active passive 
Private net lending  passive active 
Foreign net lending passive   
Table 3: Asserted causalities in prominent hypotheses. 
In the following we evaluate these relationships, summarized in table 3, using the adding-up 
constraint that the variance 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of one sector’s net lending must be equal to the negative sum of its 
covariances 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with the other sector’s net lending:12  
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  −�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖
 
This implies that we can decompose a sector’s net lending variance into the covariances of this 
sector’s net lending with that of all other sectors and test the relations postulated by Ricardian 
equivalence, twin deficit hypothesis or a Keynesian perspective statistically. 
Figure 3 shows this decomposition of each sector’s net lending variance. Blank areas equal the 
sector’s net lending variance and patterned areas represent the sector’s net lending covariances with 
that of the remaining sectors. The decomposition of the variance in foreign net lending shows no 
sizable negative correlation between the external and public deficits. In Spain the substantial 
correlation is even positive. This leads us to reject the twin deficit hypothesis for these four countries. 
Public net lending is negatively correlated with private net lending in the four big economies. At 
first glance, this supports Ricardian equivalence. Both corporate and household net lending, however, 
are pro-cyclical with respect to capacity utilization. Given that smoothing of consumption would 
require a counter-cyclical dynamic, we conclude that Ricardian equivalence does not hold for 
Germany, Great Britain, France, and Spain over the observed period.13 
                                                         
11 The concept was originally proposed by Polak (1957) and became the theoretical basis for the IMF Financial 
Programming which has been imposed on numerous (developing) countries. The hypothesis was at a hiatus during 
the Reagan era (Volcker, 1984) and is still frequently cited, especially for the United States. 
12 The algebraic and statistical apparatus follows Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008) and is further discussed in the appendix. 
13 While overall expenditure is not smoothed, the data does suggest that households smooth their consumption via 
disposable income and not via reductions or increases in savings. Similarly results have been found for the United 
States (Barbosa-Filho et al., 2008).  
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Figure 3: Decomposed variance of sectoral net lending flows. Blank areas show the variance, patterned areas the 
covariances with net lending of other sectors.  
Table 4 reports similar decompositions for the remaining sample. Public net lending highly 
correlates with private net lending in most countries (with the exceptions of Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, and Hungary). The variances of business and household net lending is explained mostly 
by the government sector and the rest of the world. The variance of financial corporations’ net 
lending is negligible many countries. The covariance between the private sectors, especially 
households and non-financial corporations is positive, while the covariance with the financial 
corporations alternates in sign between countries. 
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 Contribution of private net lending of which 
Contribution of 
foreign net lending   HH NFC FC 
AT 0.45 -0.35 1.18 -0.38 0.55 
BE 0.21 0.07 0.51 -0.37 0.79 
CZ 0.95 0.22 0.27 0.45 0.05 
DE 0.93 0.15 0.68 0.10 0.06 
DK 1.31 0.56 0.62 0.12 -0.31 
EA 1.11 0.24 0.66 0.21 -0.11 
EE 2.18 0.77 1.11 0.30 -1.18 
ES 1.30 0.47 0.66 0.17 -0.30 
FI 0.26 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.69 
FR 0.98 0.39 0.47 0.12 0.02 
GB 1.05 0.26 0.43 0.36 -0.04 
GR 1.12 0.12 0.34 0.66 -0.12 
HU 0.24 0.36 -0.16 0.04 0.76 
IE 1.15 0.42 0.17 0.57 -0.08 
IT 0.75 0.08 0.53 0.13 0.27 
LT 2.35 0.67 1.47 0.20 -1.35 
NL 0.59 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.41 
PL 1.41 0.13 1.47 -0.18 -0.40 
PT 0.92 0.37 0.15 0.41 0.10 
SE 0.95 0.43 0.38 0.15 0.07 
SI 1.71 0.10 1.28 0.34 -0.72 
SK 1.05 0.09 0.92 0.04 -0.05 
Table 4: Contributions to the variance of government net lending. The foreign-public connection asserted by the twin 
deficit hypothesis is scantly present in the data. The observable private-public relationship seems to support Ricardian 
equivalence. 
As suggested above, these patterns superficially coincide with the predictions of Ricardian equivalence. 
Nonetheless, as shown in the previous chapter, the pro-cyclical net lending and net borrowing 
behavior of households contradicts the consumption smoothing hypothesis at the core of Ricardian 
equivalence. For the twin deficit hypothesis to be considered as a possible explanation, covariances 
between government net lending and foreign net lending need to be negative, as the notion suggests 
that public net borrowing causes foreign net lending, and substantial in magnitude in comparison 
to the other covariances of foreign net lending. For all countries (with the exception of Finland 
and Belgium) the foreign-private as well as the public-private relationships play a greater role than 
the foreign-public connection.14 
5 Conclusion and implications for economic policy 
Revisions in the national accounts introduced with the European System of Accounts 1995 
introduce a sectoral decomposition of the financial and non-financial accounts. This allows us to 
conduct an analysis of the net lending and net borrowing flows of these institutional sectors in 
Europe since the introduction of the Euro in 1999, describing sectoral trends leading up to and 
since the crisis.                                                          
14 Half of the countries display positive covariances between the government’s and the rest of the world’s net lending. 
Within those countries with a negative covariance it is predominantly significantly smaller than the covariance between 
the government sector and the private sectors. Also in Finland and Belgium the twin deficit hypothesis is at least not the 
only mechanism at work as the private sector is not neutral in terms of covariance as predicted by the hypothesis.  
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Before the crisis European economies differed substantially in their sectoral net lending pattern, or 
macroeconomic structural configuration. In the Northern group (AT, BE, DE, DK FI, NL, SE) 
many countries experienced low public deficits or even budget surpluses, current account 
surpluses, and the private sector was in a net lending position. In the Southern periphery (ES, GR, 
PT), the Anglo-Saxon (IE, GB), and Eastern European countries (CZ, EE, HU, LT, PL, SI, SK), 
many governments ran public deficits and the private sectors were net borrowing, which mirrored 
in foreign net lending, i.e. current account deficits. France and Italy were most balanced with an 
average public deficit around 3 percent of GDP before the crisis, small current account deficits 
and the private sector being a net lender to the economy. 
 
The Great Recession had similar effects on sectoral net lending behavior in all countries. Consistent 
with Koo’s notion of a balance sheet recession, the private sector moved to a or increased its net lending 
position, thereby weakening aggregate demand. Public net borrowing increased as a consequence. 
Foreign imbalances reduced and the extrema of external balances converged, mostly through 
adjustment in the deficit countries. Other imbalances, however, remain. 
 
In line with the above observations, a statistical investigation of the cyclical behavior of the sectors’ 
net lending reveals that the households and business behave pro-cyclically, while the government 
exhibits a counter-cyclical behavior and the current account tends to deteriorate during upswings. 
Moreover, a statistical lead/lag analysis reveals that household net lending tends to lead the 
business cycle in many countries while especially in the Northern group the non-financial corporate 
sector tends to lag the cycle. This finding suggests that policies aimed influencing household 
behavior are more likely to contribute to a recovery than supply-side measures aiming at stimulating 
corporate investment. 
 
Finally, variance decomposition suggests that the twin deficit hypothesis is not suited to explain sectoral 
net lending trends for European countries since the introduction of the Euro. Ricardian equivalence, 
which latently features into current prescriptions of austerity and increasing ‘competitiveness’, is 
also not supported by the empirical facts. A Keynesian perspective of passive public and active 
private sectors seems to better explain the observed correlations. In our analysis we did not 
consider the possibility of the substitution between different sources of final demand (e.g. a crowding 
out of private investment by public activity) which could produce patterns consistent with the data. 
 
In light of these findings, stimulating domestic demand -- especially in the Northern group -- seems 
to be a viable alternative to the one-sided austerity policies imposed especially on the Southern 
periphery. Such an expansionary strategy would increase welfare in both country groups, while also 
increasing import demand and thereby supporting the periphery countries’ recovery process. 
External pressures with Non-EU economies could be compensated via devaluation. Moreover, the 
expansionary effect would produce the necessary leeway for governments to consolidate without 
the risk of stifling the weak recovery. The following measures have the potential to increase demand 
in the surplus countries and differ in their effectiveness and likeliness of implementation  (see also 
Glötzl et al. 2014): 
(i) A credit-financed expansion of the investment activity by non-financial 
corporations.  
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Non-financial corporations are making substantial financing surpluses. In some countries 
corporations even seek to deleverage to an extent where their credit transactions are 
negative, thus reducing the absolute amount of debt, in line with Koo’s balance sheet 
recession. Due to mechanisms of the paradox of thrift their overall leverage however remains 
high. In light of the low level of capacity utilization and a situation of liquidity trap with 
interest rates close to zero in combination with the fact that the non-financial corporations’ 
net borrowing tends to lag the cycle rather than lead it, prospects for this avenue are poor. 
Recent efforts of the ECB to lower corporate financing costs are directed at spurring 
investment demand but their effectiveness remains to be seen. 
(ii) Increased government investment.  
Government investment and discretionary spending has the potential to put a floor under 
the negative dynamic of faltering aggregate demand. Fiscal multipliers increase in 
downturns and prove especially effective in cash-constrained economies. Quantitative 
easing lowered the cost of public funds to close to zero or even negative, creating much 
needed fiscal space for debt-financed, long-term government investment. Nonetheless, 
high public debt levels and national as well as the EU regulations (such as the European 
Fiscal Compact) strongly limit the expansionary possibilities. This suggests that 
expansionary policy should be undertaken in the (Northern) surplus countries, where the 
fiscal space to do so is wider. 
(iii) Redistribution to boost demand. 
The evidence on wage-led demand in Europe (e.g. Stockhammer et al., 2008; Lavoie and 
Stockhammer, 2013) suggests that a redistribution of income toward wages boosts 
aggregate demand. Even if demand was profit-led, as argued by other studies, the adverse 
effects of redistributive policy on external competitiveness could be compensated by 
changes in the exchange rate. Such policies could involve the introduction of or increases 
in the minimum wage or a reduction of working time. A change in the personal income 
distribution, or the compression of the distribution of income within wages, would have 
similar effects as redistribution of functional income (Carvalho and Rezai, 2016). This in 
turn would brighten business expectations and revive private investment. Such an 
approach seems especially promising, as households tend to lead the business cycle. 
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